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VILLA DE LAS PALMAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. PAULA TERIFAJ, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
S109123
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
33 Cal. 4th 73; 90 P.3d 1223; 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67; 2004 Cal.
LEXIS 4839; 2004 Daily Journal DAR 7037
June 14, 2004, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Superior Court
of Riverside County, No. INC 013318, Christopher J. Sheldon, Judge. Court of
Appeal, Fourth Dist., Div. Two, No. E029449,
Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 121
Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4361 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., 2002)
DISPOSITION: Judgment of the
Court of Appeal affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
|
PROCEDURAL
POSTURE: Based on an amended declaration,
plaintiff homeowners association filed an amended complaint for injunctive
and declaratory relief and nuisance, along with a motion for preliminary
injunction, to compel defendant owner to abide by a no-pet rule. The trial
court ruled in favor of the association and granted a permanent
injunction. The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District,
Division Two, affirmed. The owner petitioned for review. |
|
OVERVIEW: Pursuant to the
authority granted in the declaration, the association had adopted a rule
prohibiting pets. The rule was in existence when the owner purchased her
condominium unit. Subsequently, the association adopted and recorded an
amended declaration, which added a no-pet restriction. The association
brought an action against the owner due to the owner's continued violation
of the restriction. The trial court found the covenants and restrictions
to be enforceable equitable servitudes and granted a permanent injunction.
The lower appellate court affirmed. On further review, the court affirmed
the judgment. The association was subject to the provisions of the
Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1350 et seq. The court concluded that under the plain
and unambiguous language of
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1354(a) and 1355(b), use restrictions in amended
declarations recorded subsequent to the challenging owner's purchase of a
condominium unit were binding on that owner, were enforceable via
injunctive relief under
Cal. Civ. Code § 1354(a), and were entitled to the same judicial
deference given use restrictions recorded prior to the owner's purchase. |
|
OUTCOME: The court
affirmed the judgment. |
CORE TERMS: declaration,
homeowner, common interest development, recorded, covenant, enforceable,
equitable, servitude, condominium, Common Interest Development Act, pet,
no-pet, common interest, amended declaration, reasonableness, effective,
promulgated, separate interest, challenging, proposed amendment, injunctive
relief, bind, dog, recorded prior, irrespective, amend, voted, deferential,
original declaration, board of directors
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Hide
Headnotes
Real & Personal Property Law > Condominiums,
Cooperatives & Homeowner Associations > Homeowner
Associations 
HN1 |
Cal. Civ. Code § 1354(a) provides
that covenants and restrictions in the declaration of a common interest
development shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless
unreasonable.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1355(b), in turn, provides that the declaration may
be amended if certain procedures are followed. The Supreme Court of
California has construed
Cal. Civ. Code § 1354(a) and held that covenants and restrictions in
the declaration are enforceable unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate
a fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of affected
land that far outweighs any benefit. More
Like This Headnote |
Real & Personal Property Law > Condominiums,
Cooperatives & Homeowner Associations > Homeowner
Associations 
HN3 |
Under the Davis-Stirling
Common Interest Development Act,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1350 et seq., a common interest development is
created whenever a separate interest coupled with an interest in the
common area or membership in an association is, or has been, conveyed and
a declaration, a condominium plan, if one exists, and a final or parcel
map are recorded.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1352. Common interest developments are required to be
managed by a homeowners association,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1363(a), defined as a nonprofit corporation or
unincorporated association created for the purpose of managing a common
interest development,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1351(a), which homeowners are generally mandated to
join. More
Like This Headnote |
Real & Personal Property Law > Condominiums,
Cooperatives & Homeowner Associations > Homeowner
Associations 
HN5 |
The Davis-Stirling
Common Interest Development Act,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1350 et seq., contains a fairly extensive definitions
section, defining "governing documents" and "declaration." The declaration
is defined as the document, however denominated, which contains the
information required by
Cal. Civ. Code § 1353.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1351(h).
Cal. Civ. Code § 1353 requires that declarations recorded on or after
January 1, 1986, contain certain information, including the development's
covenants and restrictions. The governing documents encompass a broader
category of documents, including the declaration and any other documents,
such as bylaws, operating rules of the association, articles of
incorporation, or articles of association, which govern the operation of
the common interest development or association.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1351(j). More
Like This Headnote |
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation 
HN7 |
A court's primary task
in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. The
court makes this determination by looking to the words used in the statute
and giving them their plain meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the
language of the statute, then the legislature in presumed to have meant
what it said. More
Like This Headnote |
Real & Personal Property Law > Condominiums,
Cooperatives & Homeowner Associations > Homeowner
Associations 
HN12 |
Use restrictions are an
inherent part of any common interest development and are crucial to the
stable, planned environment of any shared ownership arrangement. Such
restrictions may preclude alteration of building exteriors, limit the
number of persons that can occupy each unit, and place limitations on --
or prohibit altogether -- the keeping of pets. A homeowners association,
through an elected board of directors, is empowered to enact new rules
governing the use and occupancy of property within the development. Anyone
who buys a unit in a common interest development with knowledge of its
owners association's discretionary power accepts the risk that the power
may be used in a way that benefits the commonality but harms the
individual. More
Like This Headnote |
Real & Personal Property Law > Condominiums,
Cooperatives & Homeowner Associations > Homeowner
Associations 
HN15 |
Cal. Civ. Code § 1354(a) governs
enforcement of an amendment to a declaration because that section does not
distinguish between an original and an amended declaration. The
legislature, by using expansive language in § 1354(a), intended all
covenants and restrictions in the declaration to be enforceable against
all homeowners under that provision. Only if the covenant or restriction
in question is unreasonable will it be unenforceable under § 1354(a).
Accordingly, § 1354(a) applies to enforcement actions relating not only to
the covenants and restrictions in the original declaration, but also
covenants and restrictions in any declaration. More
Like This Headnote |
Show
Headnotes / Syllabus
COUNSEL: Law Office of Russell P.
Nowell and Russell P. Nowell for Defendant and Appellant.
Jeff Thom for California Council of the Blind as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Fiore, Racobs & Powers, Peter E. Racobs and Margaret G. Wangler for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
JUDGES: Moreno, J., with George, C.
J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Brown, JJ., concurring.
OPINIONBY: MORENO
OPINION: [***68]
[**1224]
MORENO, J.--Civil
Code section 1354, subdivision (a), n1
HN1 provides
that covenants and restrictions in the declaration of a common interest
development "shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable."
Section 1355, subdivision (b), in turn, provides that the declaration may
be amended if certain procedures are followed. In
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361
[33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63, 878 P.2d 1275] (Nahrstedt), we construed
subdivision (a) of section 1354 and held that covenants and restrictions
in the declaration are enforceable "unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate
a fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of affected land
that far outweighs any benefit." (Nahrstedt,
supra, at p. 382.) The use restriction in that case, a no-pet
restriction, was included in a condominium development's originating
declaration and recorded prior to the conveyance of any of the units.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The questions we confront in this case are whether use restrictions added to a
declaration through an amendment and recorded after a homeowner has
purchased an individual unit bind such an owner, and whether the rule of
Nahrstedt--that restrictions in a development's declaration are presumed
to [*79]
be reasonable and are enforceable unless they are arbitrary, impose an undue
burden on [**1225]
the property or violate fundamental public policy (Nahrstedt,
supra, 8 Cal.4th 361, 386 [33 Cal. [***69]
Rptr.2d 63, 878 P.2d 1275])--applies to subsequently enacted restrictions.
We are also called upon to decide whether the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to the homeowners association.
CA(1) (1)
We conclude that
HN2 under
the plain and unambiguous language of
sections 1354, subdivision (a),
and 1355, subdivision (b), use restrictions in amended declarations
recorded subsequent to a challenging homeowner's purchase of a condominium
unit are binding on that homeowner, are enforceable via injunctive relief
under
section 1354, subdivision (a), and are entitled to the same judicial
deference given use restrictions recorded prior to the homeowner's purchase.
We also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to the homeowners association as the prevailing party.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Villa De Las Palmas is a relatively small condominium development consisting
of 24 units located in a single L-shaped building. There are 12 units each on
the top and bottom levels, and all units have either a small patio or a deck,
with common walls separating them. The walls, described as "pony walls,"
initially extend from the unit at full height, and then slope down. Many
owners, including defendant Paula Terifaj, do not make Villa De Las Palmas,
which is located in Palm Springs, their primary residence, but visit only
periodically or seasonally.
The individual condominium units were conveyed to the original grantees in
1962 by recorded grant deeds that contained the development's covenants,
conditions, and restrictions, also commonly known as CC & R's. Pursuant to the
1962 deed (Declaration), all grantees were required to execute a management
agreement and "covenant and agree to observe, perform and abide by any and all
lawful by-laws, rules, regulations and conditions with respect to the use and
occupancy of said premises which may from time to time be adopted or
prescribed by the Board of Governors constituted in said Management
Agreement." Failure to abide by any covenant or restriction in the Declaration
could result in forfeiture, and "any owner or occupant of any apartment upon
said premises may bring legal action for injunction and/or damages against
said defaulting owner ... ." The Declaration further provided that "[t]he
benefits and obligations of this deed shall inure to and be binding upon the
heirs ... and assigns of the respective parties hereto."
Pursuant to the authority granted in the Declaration, the Villa De Las Palmas
Homeowners Association (the Association) adopted a rule prohibiting [*80]
pets. The unrecorded rule provided: "Pets of any kind are forbidden to be kept
in the apartment building or on the grounds at any time." While the exact date
of the adoption of the no-pet rule is unknown, it is undisputed that it was in
existence when Terifaj purchased her unit. Terifaj, a veterinarian who
purchased her unit in 1995, did not receive a written copy of the rule
prohibiting pets, but she admitted at trial that she was aware of the no-pet
rule when she purchased her unit.
Despite the prohibition on pets, from the time Terifaj purchased her unit
until 1998, she visited her unit with her dog Lucy. When Lucy died in 1998,
Terifaj acquired another dog, a female boxer, and brought her to the property.
Terifaj attempted to have the Association amend the no-pet rule at the
Association's 1996 and 2000 general meetings, but was unsuccessful.
The Association repeatedly warned Terifaj that she was violating the rule
prohibiting pets on the property and fined her accordingly. Terifaj, however,
was undeterred [***70]
and continued to bring her dog to the development. In response, in August
1999, the Association filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief
and nuisance, along with a motion for preliminary injunction, to compel
Terifaj to abide by the no-pet rule. The trial court denied the motion for
preliminary injunction in October 1999, ruling that it was not convinced the
Association would prevail on the merits and that irreparable injury was not
evident. The court ordered the case to nonbinding arbitration with a March 8,
2000, completion date.
[**1226]
In the interim between the denial of the preliminary injunction and the
completion of arbitration, the members of the Association voted to amend the
Declaration. In January 2000, the Association adopted and recorded the Amended
and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (Amended
Declaration), which added a no-pet restriction, providing: "No pets or animals
of any kind, including without limitation, dogs, cats, birds, livestock,
reptiles or poultry, may be kept or permitted in any Apartment or anywhere on
the Property." The Amended Declaration further provides that violations of the
covenants and restrictions contained in the Amended Declaration are nuisances,
and that such violations may be enjoined.
Based on the recorded Amended Declaration, the Association filed an amended
complaint alleging the same causes of action and seeking the same relief as
the original complaint. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in
favor of the Association on all causes of action. It found the covenants and
restrictions in the Amended Declaration to be enforceable equitable
servitudes, granted a permanent injunction against any further violation of
the no-pet restriction, and found the violation to be a nuisance. The court
awarded the Association $ 15,000 in attorney fees. [*81]
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It concluded that
section 1354 "[o]n its face ... applies to any declaration, regardless of
when it is adopted and recorded." Because the no-pet restriction was in the
recorded Amended Declaration, it therefore constituted an equitable servitude
under
section 1354, subdivision (a). Relying on Nahrstedt, which the
Court of Appeal found governed review of the pet restriction, the court held
the restriction was not unreasonable.
We granted Terifaj's petition for review.
II. Discussion
As a condominium project, Villa De Las Palmas is a common interest development
subject to the provisions of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development
Act (the Davis-Stirling Act or the Act). (§
1350 et seq.) The Davis-Stirling Act, enacted in 1985 (Stats. 1985, ch.
874, § 14, pp. 2774-2786), consolidated the statutory law governing
condominiums and other common interest developments.
HN3 CA(2) (2)
Under the Act, a common interest development is created "whenever a
separate interest coupled with an interest in the common area or membership in
[an] association is, or has been, conveyed" and a declaration, a condominium
plan, if one exists, and a final or parcel map are recorded. n2 (§
1352.) Common interest developments are required to be managed by a
homeowners association (§
1363, subd. (a)), defined as "a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated
association created for the purpose of managing a common interest development"
(§
1351, subd. (a)), which [***71]
homeowners are generally mandated to join (Nahrstedt,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 373).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Although Villa De Las Palmas was created prior to the enactment of the
Davis-Stirling Act,
HN4 the
Act applies to common interest developments in existence prior to its
enactment. (§
1352;
Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 378, fn. 8.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HN5 The
Act contains a fairly extensive definitions section, defining as relevant here
"governing documents" and "declaration." The declaration is defined as "the
document, however denominated, which contains the information required by
section 1353." (§
1351, subd. (h).)
Section 1353 requires that declarations recorded on or after January 1,
1986, contain certain information, including the development's covenants and
restrictions. The governing documents encompass a broader category of
documents, including "the declaration and any other documents, such as bylaws,
operating rules of the association, articles of incorporation, or articles of
association, which govern the operation of the common interest development or
association." (§
1351, subd. (j).)
HN6 CA(3) (3)
The declaration is often referred to as the development's constitution
(see
Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 6.10, com. a, p. 196; 1 Hanna & Van [*82]
Atta, Cal. Common Interest Developments: Law and Practice (2003) § 22:2, p.
1325) and "establish[es] a system of governance." (Villa
Milano Homeowners Assn. v. Il Davorge (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 819, 827 [**1227]
[102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1].) Importantly, it contains the development's
covenants and restrictions, which are "enforceable equitable servitudes,
unless unreasonable." (§
1354, subd. (a).) Several provisions of the Act allow for the amendment of
the declaration. Of particular relevance here is
section 1355, subdivision (b) (hereafter
section 1355(b)), which provides in relevant part: "Except to the extent
that a declaration provides by its express terms that it is not amendable, in
whole or in part, a declaration which fails to include provisions permitting
its amendment at all times during its existence may be amended at any time."
n3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 In addition to
section 1355(b), the Davis-Stirling Act provides several methods for
amending the declaration.
Section 1355, subdivision (a), provides that a declaration may be amended
pursuant to its own amendment provisions or pursuant to other provisions of
the Act;
section 1356 allows a homeowners association to petition the court for
approval of an amendment if the declaration provides for a larger majority
than the association is able to muster, provided at least 50 percent of the
owners vote in favor of the proposed amendment;
section 1355.5 provides for the deletion of certain developer-oriented
provisions;
section 1357 provides for the extension of a termination date set forth in
a declaration.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Terifaj's argument is somewhat ambiguous with respect to enforcement of
restrictions contained in amended declarations. She appears to argue that such
restrictions are entirely unenforceable in any manner, but also maintains that
such restrictions are not enforceable pursuant to
section 1354, subdivision (a), because they do not meet the requirements
of equitable servitudes. Since her argument is vague, we address both
contentions.
Because we are construing provisions in the Davis-Stirling Act, we briefly
recite the rules of statutory construction that will guide our decision.
HN7 CA(4) (4)
Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the
Legislature. (Peracchi
v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1253 [135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 70
P.3d 1054].) We make this determination by looking to the words used in
the statute and giving them their plain meaning. (Smith
v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 358 [127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516,
58 P.3d 367].) " '... "If there is no ambiguity in the language of the
statute, 'then the Legislature in presumed to have meant what it said.' " ' "
(Ibid.) [***72]
A.
We must first decide whether a use restriction contained in an amended
declaration is enforceable against a homeowner who acquired his or her
separate interest before the challenged amendment was adopted and recorded.
CA(5) (5)
As noted above,
HN8 under
the Davis-Stirling Act, a common interest [*83]
development may amend its declaration pursuant to the provisions of the
declaration itself or under the provisions of the Act. When a declaration is
silent on whether it may be amended,
section 1355(b) provides that it may be amended at any time. For the
following reasons, we conclude that use restrictions added to a declaration by
amendment bind not only subsequent purchasers, but current homeowners as well.
This conclusion follows from the plain language of
section 1355(b), which provides in part: "For purposes of this
subdivision, an amendment is only effective after (1) the proposed
amendment has been distributed to all of the owners of separate interests in
the common interest development by first-class mail postage prepaid or
personal delivery not less than 15 days and not more than 60 days prior to any
approval being solicited; (2) the approval of owners representing more than 50
percent ... of the separate interests in the common interest development has
been given, and that fact has been certified in a writing, executed and
acknowledged by an officer of the association; and (3) the amendment has been
recorded in each county in which a portion of the common interest development
is located." (Italics added.) Additionally, a copy of the recorded amendment
must immediately be mailed or delivered to all homeowners. n4
CA(6) (6)
In short, the statute provides [**1228]
that an amendment is effective after notice of the proposed amendment is given
to the homeowners, a majority of the homeowners approve the amendment, and the
amendment is recorded. (1 Hanna & Van Atta, Cal. Common Interest Developments:
Law and Practice, supra, § 22:119, p. 1439; 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real
Estate (3d ed. 2001) § 25:133, pp. 302-303.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4
Section 1355(b) provides in full:
HN9 "Except
to the extent that a declaration provides by its express terms that it is not
amendable, in whole or in part, a declaration which fails to include
provisions permitting its amendment at all times during its existence may be
amended at any time. For purposes of this subdivision, an amendment is only
effective after (1) the proposed amendment has been distributed to all of the
owners of separate interests in the common interest development by first-class
mail postage prepaid or personal delivery not less than 15 days and not more
than 60 days prior to any approval being solicited; (2) the approval of owners
representing more than 50 percent, or any higher percentage required by the
declaration for the approval of an amendment to the declaration, of the
separate interests in the common interest development has been given, and that
fact has been certified in a writing, executed and acknowledged by an officer
of the association; and (3) the amendment has been recorded in each county in
which a portion of the common interest development is located. A copy of any
amendment adopted pursuant to this subdivision shall be distributed by
first-class mail postage prepaid or personal delivery to all of the owners of
separate interest immediately upon its recordation."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
HN10 CA(7) (7)
Plainly read, any amendment duly adopted under this subdivision is
effective against all homeowners, irrespective of when the owner acquired
title to the separate interest or whether the homeowner voted for the [*84]
amendment. (See, e.g., 1 Hanna & Van Atta, Cal. Common Interest Developments:
Law and Practice, supra, § 22:119, p. 1439; 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real
Estate, supra, § 25:133, p. 308.) Terifaj's argument that subsequently
enacted amendments are not binding on current homeowners runs counter to
section 1355(b)'s express language that an amendment is effective upon the
satisfaction of [***73]
the requirements enumerated in that provision. Neither
section 1355(b) nor any other provision in the Davis-Stirling Act exempts
from compliance with amendments to the declaration homeowners who purchased
their individual units prior to the amendment.
That is not surprising. To allow a declaration to be amended but limit its
applicability to subsequent purchasers would make little sense.
HN11 CA(8) (8)
A requirement for upholding covenants and restrictions in common interest
developments is that they be uniformly applied and burden or benefit all
interests evenly. (See, e.g.,
Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 368 [restrictions must be
"uniformly enforced"];
Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 6.10, com. f, p. 200.) This requirement
would be severely undermined if only one segment of the condominium
development were bound by the restriction. It would also, in effect, delay the
benefit of the restriction or the amelioration of the harm addressed by the
restriction until every current homeowner opposed to the restriction sold his
or her interest. This would undermine the stability of the community, rather
than promote stability as covenants and restrictions are intended to do.
Terifaj's position would also, essentially, render meaningless the simple
majority vote required for amendments to take effect under
section 1355(b). Instead, unanimous consent would be needed, which would
often be unattainable.
CA(9) (9)
The language of
section 1355(b), however, makes clear that a simple majority is all that
is required before an amendment becomes effective. One reason for this is
because amendment provisions are designed to "prevent[] a small number of
holdouts from blocking changes regarded by the majority to be necessary to
adapt to changing circumstances and thereby permit the community to retain its
vitality over time." (Rest.3d
Property, Servitudes, § 6.10, com. a, p. 196.)
Subjecting owners to use restrictions in amended declarations promotes
stability within common interest developments. As we observed in Nahrstedt,
HN12 "[u]se
restrictions are an inherent part of any common interest development and are
crucial to the stable, planned environment of any shared ownership
arrangement." (Nahrstedt,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 372.) Such restrictions may "preclude
alteration of building exteriors, limit the number of persons that [*85]
can occupy each unit, and place limitations on--or prohibit altogether--the
keeping of pets. [Citations.]" (Id.
at p. 373.) We [**1229]
explained that a homeowners association, "through an elected board of
directors, is empowered ... to enact new rules governing the use and occupancy
of property within the [development]." (Ibid.) We further observed that
"anyone who buys a unit in a common interest development with knowledge of its
owners association's discretionary power accepts 'the risk that the power may
be used in a way that benefits the commonality but harms the individual.' " (Id.,
at p. 374, quoting Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in
Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association (1990)
51 Ohio State L.J. 41, 67.) A prospective homeowner who purchases property
in a common interest development should be aware that new rules and
regulations may be adopted by the homeowners association either through the
board's rulemaking power or through the association's amendment powers. (See,
e.g., Randolph, Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of Common
Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the Face of Vested [***74]
Expectations? (1998)
38 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1081, 1126 ["There is no basis to argue that
purchasers of units within common interest communities have an expectation
that there will be no changes at all."].)
Finally,
section 1355(b)'s legislative history supports the conclusion that all
homeowners are bound by amendments adopted and recorded subsequent to
purchase. (Jarrow
Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 736 [3 Cal. Rptr. 3d
636, 74 P.3d 737]
HN13 [court
"may observe that available legislative history buttresses a plain language
construction"].)
Subdivision (b) of section 1355 was not part of the bill enacting the
Davis-Stirling Act, but was added three years later in 1988. (Stats. 1988, ch.
1409, § 1, p. 4776 [Assem. Bill No. 4426].) n5 An enrolled bill report from
the Department of Real Estate states that "[m]embers of a homeowners'
association ... should not forever be saddled with provisions they desire to
change." (Cal. Dept. of Real Estate, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No.
4426 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 1988, p. 1.) Significantly, the report
recommended approval of Assembly Bill No. 4426, despite acknowledging that
current homeowners may have relied on the restrictions in place at the time
they made their purchase, stating: "The failure to include a provision for
amendment may indicate an intentional omission. Additionally, some changes may
provide for inconsistent uses which were not previously permissible. Many
owners may have acquired [*86]
their interest in the subdivision because of such a restriction limiting use.
To permit an amendment would affect their reasonable expectations." (Enrolled
Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 4426, supra, p. 2.) The Legislature was
thus aware that amendments could affect settled or reasonable expectations of
some homeowners, but it did not limit the language of
section 1355(b) to exempt those homeowners from
subdivision (b)'s operation. Tellingly, nothing in the text of
section 1355(b) indicates the Legislature intended only subsequent
purchasers or homeowners who voted for an amendment to be bound by a use
restriction so enacted.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5
Section 1355(b) initially contained a sunset provision with a termination
date of January 1, 1990. In 1993, the Legislature amended the subdivision by
deleting the sunset provision. (§
1355(b), as amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 21, § 1, pp. 134-135.)
Section 1355(b), therefore, was inoperative between January 1, 1990 and
January 1, 1994.
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CA(10) (10)
Section 1355(b)'s express language and the limited legislative history
compel the conclusion that all homeowners are bound by amendments made to a
declaration pursuant to that section. Accordingly, we conclude that all
homeowners are subject to use restrictions contained in amended declarations
irrespective of when the amendment was passed.
B.
To enforce the no-pet r |